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The Emergence of Democratic Participation in

Global Governance (Paris, 1919)
STEVE CHARNOVITZ °

The theme of this Tenth Anniversary issue, "Globalization and
Governance: The Prospects for Democracy," is a fitting and timely topic. By
way of introduction, this article will begin by discussing each of these concepts
briefly.
"Globalization" has become a buzzword in recent years, in part because it
has so many important dimensions.' Culture is globalizing as the ideas, styles,
and technologies from each society infiltrate others on a continuous basis. The
economy is globalizing as money moves without hindrance across borders, and
goods, services, and workers seek to overcome protectionist barriers.
Environmental globalization occurs as scientists and policymakers increasingly
understand the planet's ecosystems and the ways in which environmental
mismanagement in one region affects other regions. Politics is globalizing as
governments and societies make greater efforts to influence each other and as
internal tensions in one country spread to neighbors.
"Governance" is an apt term for describing decisionmaking processes that
are less formal than a government.2 Although no international government
exists in a world of notionally sovereign nation states, global governance
certainly does exist, and these processes have grown deeper in recent decades.
One of the key challenges of governance is siting authoritative decisions at the
proper level to coincide with the scope of the problem being addressed. 3 The
proper level in economic or environmental terms might not match the
governmental units available for making and implementing decisions.
The "prospects for democracy" is a broad topic that scholars are addressing
in distinct ways. A central concern is the viability of democracy in changing
* Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.
1. See generally GEORGE SOROS, GEORGE SOROS ON GLOBALIZATION (2002); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
2. See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS

(James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) (discussing governance and politics in a global
context); GLOBAL TRENDS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Paul Kennedy et al. eds., 2002).
3. See Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the FalloflnternationalLaw?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345,360-66
(2000).
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configurations of world politics. Free elections are essential to democracy; yet
democracy requires more than that. In his monumental analysis of Democracy
in America in 1848, Alexis de Tocqueville discovered the vital role of political
4
and civil associations in informing and sustaining democracy.
The importance of such participation to national democracy is now
recognized and promoted by international organizations. For example, the
World Bank reports that "[i]ncreasing opportunities for voice and participation
can improve state capability ..... 5 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights
states that at the national level, "the widest participation in the democratic
dialogue by all sectors and actors of society must be promoted in order to come
to agreements on appropriate solutions...., 6 The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development has extolled the value of "active participation"
at the national level in which there is "a role for citizens in proposing policy
options and shaping the policy dialogue-although the responsibility for the
7
final decision or policy formulation rests with government."
Although the democratic value of a contestation of ideas at the national
level is an accepted nostrum today, the extension of that principle to the
international level remains controversial, even in an era of globalization. The
debate is not about freedom of speech; few would deny that an individual
should be able to advocate ideas outside of his country, or to engage in
discourse with foreign government officials and private individuals. Rather, the
debate is about whether there is a democratic imperative in giving individuals
opportunities to participate in global governance. Such opportunities can be
justified for their contribution to national democracy. As Susan Marks has
explained, "democracy cannot flourish in nation-states unless efforts are made
to democratize the processes of transnational and global decision-making as
well." 8 Unbounded participation can also be justified for its contribution to
4. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 189-95, 513-17, 520-24 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1988)

(1848).
5. WORLD BANK, THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 116 (1997).

6. Steven Wheatley, Democracy in InternationalLaw:A EuropeanPerspective, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
225, 246 (2002) (quoting E/CN 4/RES/1995/60, pmbl.).
7. OECD, PUMA POLICY BRIEF NO. 10: ENGAGING CITIZENS IN POLICY-MAKING: INFORMATION,
CONSULTATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, 2 (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/
M00007815.pdf.
8. Susan Marks, Democracy and InternationalGovernance, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 47, 66 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001); see also Robert Howse, The
Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, id. at
355, 362 (stating that international civil society may underpin deliberative democracy at the global level).
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multilateral decisionmaking. Boutros Boutros-Ghali has observed that
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), parliamentarians, and international
lawyers act at various levels of the international system as "mechanisms of
democracy." 9 A recent U.N. Human Development Report stated that "[o]ne big
development in opening opportunities for people to participate in global
governance has been the growing strength and influence of NGOs-in both the
North and the South."' 0
Opening opportunities for people is the theme of this article, which is
divided into four parts. Part I examines the concept of democracy at the
international level, and finds that some democratization already ensues. Part II
looks for the roots of this phenomenon, and postulates that it originated in 1919
at the Paris Peace Conference. Part III suggests that this key event should be
called a global constitutional moment. A brief Part IV concludes.
I. THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY
The concept of democracy at the international level needs elaboration.
Although a world government does not exist, there are treaties, international
organizations, and negotiations that can be described as being on the
"international plane."" At issue is whether these intergovernmental activities
are carried out democratically.
Questions abound: Is it clear that an international level or plane exists?
Perhaps treaties and international organizations are just extensions of the
nation-state on the same horizontal level. Viewed in this way, it may be that
nothing international exists to be benchmarked against democratic norms. On
the other hand, if one accepts that the United Nations (U.N.), the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and other organizations are tangible enough to be
evaluated distinctly from the governments that comprise them, the evaluation
needs to identify the relevant public with which the international organization
should be in democratic counterpoise. It is often averred that international
organizations have no demos of their own. In national law, the United Nations
9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative, I GLOB. GOVERNANCE 1, 10
(1995).
10. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 35.

11.The term "international plane" was in use by the early twentieth century. See Editorial Comment, The
International Opium Conference, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 466 (1911); Tor Hugo Wistrand, The Principle of
Equilibrium and the Present Period, 15 AM. J.INT'L L. 523 (1921).
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has no citizens, as citizenship is obtained from states. But is a grant of
citizenship a necessary precondition for individuals to pursue a democratic
relationship with a governance structure?
To give a brief answer to these difficult questions, this article takes the
position that the international-level decisionmaking has sufficient substance
that sentient beings can rationally seek to influence it. This is especially so
when international institutions can directly affect individuals. For example, the
U.N. Security Council may require governments to impose sanctions that can
directly harm innocent individuals. From the perspective of the individual
collaterally damaged, the Council is more than just an appendage of the
individual's home government.
In recent years, the democratic bona fides of international organizations
have come under attack.' 2 The charge of a "democratic deficit" is frequently
leveled at the WTO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and somewhat less so at the United Nations and the International Court
of Justice. At outdoor rallies held at intergovernmental meetings, some
protestors have chanted the slogan: "No globalization without representation."
A. Meaning of DemocraticDeficit
What does it mean to say that there is a democratic deficit at the
international level?
Consider three possibilities:
First, international
organizations are not run in a democratic manner vis-A-vis participating states.
Second, international law and treaties do not sufficiently mandate democracy
within each state. Third, international organizations are not run in a democratic
manner vis-A-vis the public. These propositions are discussed below.
It is easy to point to examples of how the nation-state members of
international organizations lack equal rights in the governance process. The
permanent seats in the U.N. Security Council and the weighted voting in the
IMF are two obvious ones. 13 The fact that other states have consented to these
arrangements in joining the organization should not be forgotten, yet consent
alone could not legitimize a normatively flawed form of delegation.

12. Citizens in the InternationalRealm: The New ParticipatoryDemands, 95 ASIL PROC. 162 (2001).
13. See Kofi A. Annan, Democracy as an InternationalIssue, in 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 135, 140 (2002)
(observing that most states believe that the U.N. would be more democratic if the Security Council were more
representative).
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The proposition that international democracy requires equal status of states
is questionable, however. 14 Democracy is a commitment to popular rule by the
people based on equal rights under law. But what is true for individuals in a
community is not necessarily true for states in a community of nations. "One
state one vote" does not follow logically from "one man one vote." On the
contrary, giving China and San Tome and Principe an equal say would seem to
contradict the principle of "one man one vote," in view of the huge population
disparity between the two countries. It is interesting to note that the U.N.
Charter states that the Organization is based on "the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members."' 5 This principle does not seem to mean that
governments have a sovereign right to equal participation in U.N. processes.
Rather, it means that governments are equally sovereign vis-a-vis each other.
In some instances, the inconsistent treatment of governments within an
international organization is more properly addressed as a concern about rule of
law than about democracy. For example, there is often criticism of "green
room" practices in the WTO wherein the officials leading a negotiation will
invite selected governments into a room to hammer out a deal that is later
presented to the entire membership as a fait accompli.16 Because the results
reached in the green room must be consented to by the entire WTO
membership, the charge that the green room is antidemocratic is not exactly
true. Perhaps a better criticism of the green room is that the legal procedures
that could be used to delegate a task to an elected committee are not being used,
and instead informal arrangements are undertaken that favor the governments
with the most clout. Green room abuses are not confined to the WTO. For
example, at a preparatory meeting held in Bali in June 2002 for the World
Summit on Sustainable Development, the delegates of Australia, Canada,
7
Norway, and Switzerland were frozen out of ad hoc drafting discussions.'
A second view of the democratic deficit is that multilateral organizations
fail to require democratic government as a condition for membership. As a
14. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance:
InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 613-14 (1999).

A Coming Challenge for

15. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1.
16. See Supachai Panitchpakdi, Remarks, in THE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE INTERNATIONAL

TRADING SYSTEM 4,7 (Columbia Business School APEC Study Center, 2002) (criticizing WTO green room
meetings); Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and
Outcomes in the GA TT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 368 (2002) (noting that at the WTO Seattle Ministerial,
some delegates from developing countries tried to crash the green room discussions).
17. Earth Negotiations Bulletin, June 10, 2002, at http://www.iisd.caflinkages/2002/vol22/enb2241e.html.
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result, the United Nations and the WTO (to name just two organizations)
consist of numerous governments that are not democracies and cannot make
any serious claim to be representing the volitions of their people. This
disinterest in the type of government used in a country can also be seen in the
customary law norms on the recognition of states.' 8 One of the criteria is
whether the government has "effective control" over the population.! 9 This
stance seems to be backward from where it should be; the utmost concern of the
world community should be whether the population has effective control over
the territorial government. In recent years, international organizations have
taken a greater interest in the existence of democracy at the national level.20
A third view of the democratic deficit is that multilateral organizations
(such as the WTO) and international agenda-setting bodies (such as the Group
of Eight) operate too remotely from the public that is ostensibly being served.
Many international organizations have legal personality, a headquarters, a
director and staff, and a mandate to draft treaties or make nonbinding
recommendations to governments.
Such organizations go well beyond
traditional bilateral diplomatic bargaining among governments, and therefore,
one can demand democratic qualities supplemental to those at the governmental
level. Concerns about the lack of democracy are especially salient when
international organizations act to sanction governments or to restrict their
autonomy. The public may also have concern when an international
organization (like the World Bank) provides loans for a project that may have
deleterious environmental impact on recipient and surrounding countries.
At issue, however, is what implication such concerns have. If there is no
recognition of individual agency by an international organization, then how can
a democratic deficit be said to exist? While the possibility of a democratic
deficit could be denied as a matter of definition, other claims in the
globalization debate are harder to shake off.

18. See James Crawford, Democracy and the Body of InternationalLaw, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 95 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) (explaining that under
classical international law, there was no requirement that the government of a state should have been
democratically elected).
19. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (7th ed.

1997).
20. See, e.g., Promotingand ConsolidatingDemocracy, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 114(b),
U.N. Doc. A/res/55/96 (2001).
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In recent years, analysts have asked whether international organizations are
legitimate and whether they are accountable to the public. 2' Democracy can
confer legitimacy on a government, and therefore any inquiry into legitimacy
may look at democratic underpinnings as one factor. Accountability raises the
obvious question of accountability to whom. Yet those who deny that an
international organization can be democratic (because there is no demos) may
find it uncomfortable to argue that international organizations need not be
accountable to the affected public.
B. Participationin InternationalOrganizations
This article is concerned with the third view of a democratic deficit. The
key question is whether international organizations should limit themselves to
input exclusively from the states, or should also invite participation by a
broader array of actors. The appropriateness of participation is acknowledged
to some extent in Article 71 of the U.N. Charter, which states that, "[t]he
Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation
with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within
its competence. ' '22 Today, over 2,140 NGOs have been granted consultative
status with the United Nations. 3
We have increasingly come to recognize the ways in which the expansion
of democracy and public participation at the national level has influenced the
nature of the international organization. Doctrinally, the international
organization has a membership of sovereign states, yet this sovereignty has
eroded in two significant ways. One is that, because of globalization and
interdependence, most states are under the constant influence of other states.
The other way is that the elites who determine and implement so-called foreign
policy are far more micromanaged by the political process than they were one
or two generations ago. Thus, the democratic process within the state has an
increasing influence on both home and foreign governments.
This changing character of member state politics constantly reshapes the
international organization. From the organizational center, each state appears to
be a vector of the political forces within it, and as a result, the international
2 1.THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 8;EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001).
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 71.
23. E-mail from NGO Section of United Nations (June 17, 2002) (on file with author).
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organization has an incentive to respond by seeking to engage those domestic
forces in dialogue. It little behooves the international organization to maintain
the fiction that it is only a contract between states and to ignore the third party
beneficiaries 24 of the contract (namely, the people) when those individuals
collectively elect the governments that supervise the international organizations.
Recognition that the roots of international organizations go deeper than the
state's perimeter can be seen in recent publications of international
organizations. In 2000, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan presided over the
preparation of a report entitled, "We the Peoples. The Role of the United
Nations in the 21st Century.- 25 Annan declared that "the international public
domain.., must be opened up further to the participation of the many actors
whose contributions are essential to managing the path of globalization. 26 In
2002, the WTO issued a brochure on its new Doha Agenda. The brochure
states that "[w]ith the accession of China and nine other members from 19992001, the WTO has added another 1.5 billion people and now covers 97% of
the world's population., 27 Although this statement itself is unexceptional, it is
at variance with the trading system's self-image as a contract among Members
with no connection at all to the public. It is interesting, then, that the WTO
Secretariat writes advertising material that portrays the organization as being
composed of people.
It is possible to address the relationship of the public to international
organizations without using the language of democratic theory. After all, the
opportunity to petition preceded democracy.
Opportunities to submit
suggestions exist in many organizations that are not democratically run, such as
corporations or schools.
But if the term "democracy" is dodged, one misses the possibilities for
purposefully adding more democratic process into the international level to
make up for democratic loss at the national level through international
organizations and treatymaking. Executive officials in governments generally
have far greater license to take actions in international organizations than they
24. See Steven R. Ratner, Democracy and Accountability: The Criss-CrossingPaths of Two Emerging
Norms, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 449,451 (stating that in
the positivist school of international law, individuals were at best third-party beneficiaries).
25. KOFI A. ANNAN, "WE THE PEOPLES": THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(2000).
26. Id. at 13.
27. WTO, THE ROAD TO DOHA AND BEYOND-A ROAD MAP FOR SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDING THE
DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 4 (2002).
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do in domestic processes. Although some international agreements may require
approval by national parliaments, this decision will not be based solely on the
merits of the proposed action, but also on the costs of failing to acquiesce in a
broad agreement. In other words, because parliamentary approval is not sought
until after a deal is made, and because the parliaments act separately to consider
the agreement, each parliament may be reluctant to singularly abandon the deal.
Furthermore, for many actions, parliamentary approval is not even required.
For example, as Oxfam has noted, "most governments can enter into
agreements at the WTO without sufficient reference to public opinion or
parliamentary scrutiny. ... ""
In suggesting the need for international pluralist processes, this article does
not mean to devalue the importance of improving control of foreign policy at
the national level through parliamentary oversight and advisory committee
action. Indeed, because treaties may commit governments to take prescribed
actions in the future and to refrain from taking prohibited actions, treaties are
akin to constitutional rules which are often adopted only after receiving
supermajority approval.
The democratic problem is more difficult when it comes to undoing a treaty
commitment. While a national constitution can typically be changed by
domestic supermajorities in the future, it is not so easy to escape from treaty
obligations. 29 Abrogating a treaty may be formally possible, but could be very
costly for a country. By making the cost high, a government negotiating a
treaty may seek to lock in its desired rule for its successors.
When governments meet to negotiate or to administer a treaty, the
legitimacy of such a congress of nations springs from the delegated authority of
each government's delegate. In embodying the government, that delegate
should be as open to public opinion as the remainder of the government would
be at home. Or to put it another way, just as stakeholders seek to influence
national lawmakers, it is equally legitimate for stakeholders to seek to influence
a national plenipotentiary sent to an international conference.
The internationality of such conferences changes the relationship of a
citizen to her government. Since the decisions are being made by a group of
28. OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS. TRADE, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE FIGHT
AGAINST POVERTY 255 (2002).

29. See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral
Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 107 (2002) (suggesting that WTO commitments can amount to a
higher degree of irreversibility than even for constitutional amendments).
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countries, why should a citizen in Country A limit her lobbying to just the
delegate from Country A? This citizen may lack privity with the delegates from
Country B and C, but on the other hand, they are making decisions that will
affect her. Furthermore, citizens from A, B, and C may find that they have a
common interest. Shouldn't this A-B-C stakeholder coalition be able to
promote its common interest at the intergovernmental conference? As this
article will show, interest groups answered these questions affirmatively many
decades ago when NGOs began espousing transnational causes.
In calling for more democratic process to be available at the international
level, this article is not suggesting that elections be held for a global parliament
or for U.N. officials. Instead, the thesis here is that international organizations
should be transparent in their activities and should provide more opportunities
for policy discourse and contestation of ideas among NGOs and governments.
Today, NGOs have expectations that they will be able to participate to
some extent in the activities and decisionmaking of international organizations.
Of course, these expectations are not new. The U.N. Non-Governmental
Liaison Service has facilitated dialogue and cooperation between NGOs and the
U.N. system for twenty-seven years. The Service puts out a periodic newsletter
with the title "Go Between" that evokes the mission of the NGOs going
between the states and the United Nations.
Thinking about the NGO role is important for explaining and predicting the
outputs of international organizations. The treaty on landmines is perhaps the
clearest example of NGO influence, 30 yet one can see shades of the same
phenomenon in just about every international lawmaking process. For
example, an explanation of the negotiation of the WTO Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that failed to consider
the role of business groups would be inadequate.
One school of international law has always recognized pluralist processes
of decisionmaking-the so-called "New Haven School" pioneered by Myres
McDougal. 3 1 For example, in a study published in 1980 on "Human Rights and

30. See Daniel W. Drezner, On the BalanceBetween InternationalLaw and Domestic Sovereignty, 2 CHlI.
J. INT'L L. 321, 328 (2001) (noting that the origin of the land mines treaty clearly lies with NGOs, not
sovereign states who were relative latecomers).
31. Richard Falk, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the New Jurisprudenceof Global Civil
Society, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 333, 337-38 (1997) (noting that the New Haven approach
encourages a far wider understanding of the legal process including the participants from civil society).
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World Public Order," McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen
explained that
[t]he choice in features of world constitutive process is not one
of simple dichotomy: either a world controlled solely by
"sovereign" nation-states or of a world government
supplanting all the existing nation-states. Ours is a world of
pluralism and diversity .

.

.

nation-states, international

governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups,
and private associations-are forms of associations through
which individuals cooperate to achieve fulfillment of their
demands.3 2
While acknowledging authority structures denoted as legislative, executive,
judicial, and administrative, the New Haven School focuses instead on the key
authority functions (intelligence, promotion, prescription, invoking, application,
33
termination, and appraisal) that apply at all levels of public order.
The authority functions of international organizations are now receiving
considerable attention. Borrowing the idea of checks and balances within a
national constitution, analysts are looking for checks and balances at the
international level, and are seeing the role of NGOs as an important part of the
needed matrix.34 For example, Michael Edwards writes:
The future lies in a better distribution of power through the
international system, expressed in a wider variety of channels,
with more checks and balances. That requires the exercise of
'multiple citizenship', as sociologists call it, realising our
rights and exercising our responsibilities as members of
communities and local pressure groups, citizens of our

32. MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THEBASICPOuCIESOF
AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 179 (1980) (internal footnote omitted).
33. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S.McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY 28-29 (1997).

34. John King Gamble & Charlotte Ku, InternationalLaw-New Actors and New Technologies: Center
Stagefor NGOs?, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 221,226 (2000) (asking whether NGOs can be a check against
non-democratic, unaccountable, and aloof intergovernmental institutions).
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national polity, consumers in the global marketplace, and-for
the future-constituents of international regimes.3 5
Daniel Esty calls for the WTO "to build new connections to the publics around
the world in whose name trade policy is advanced as well as to strengthen the
broader institutional structure of checks and balances within which the WTO
36
operates.,
This article comes at a time when NGO influence may be on the wane.37
Al Qaeda is, after all, an NGO, and civilized society does not accept its tactics
and demands, or its use of charitable organizations as conduits for financing
terror. In response to the attacks of September 11, the American public
probably now views governmental action relatively more favorably as
compared to nongovernmental action than it did before that date. The idea of a
cosmopolitan community in a borderless world has receded from national
consciousness. Instead, the focus in the United States is on "homeland"
security, thus reaffirming the link between the state and the citizens it should
protect. Furthermore, even before September 11, the reputation of activist
groups was already tarnished from the disruptive actions taken by NGOs at
intergovernmental conferences such as Seattle, Quebec City, Milan, and
Washington. Although it is important to acknowledge these developments visA-vis the timing of this article, the underlying need for more effective global
governance remains, and so the trends discussed in this article will continue.
C. Overview of the Debate
The problem of democracy in global governance has received considerable
commentary in recent years. In this article, let me point to three perspectivesthe state centrists, the pessimists, and the reformists. Each is discussed briefly
below.
The state centrists argue that democracy is a state-centered concept and has
no meaning at the international level. As Susan Marks explains in critiquing
35. MICHAEL EDWARDS, FUTURE POSITIVE: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION INTHE 21 ST CENTURY 178
(2000) (internal citations omitted).
36. Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization'sLegitimacy Crisis, I WORLD TRADE REV. 7, 10
(2002).
37. Ifa waning is occurring, that should not be surprising: there is evidence that NGO influence is cyclical.
See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and InternationalGovernance, 18 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 183, 268-70 (1997).
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this viewpoint, the nation-state is viewed as democracy's "container" and
therefore democratic politics is bounded within the state.38 Martin Wolf has
adopted this position with respect to the WTO in his observation39that "[a]s an
agreement among states, the WTO cannot itself be democratic.,
In a variant of the state-centric viewpoint, analysts will agree with the claim
that the international organization has to be democratic, but then counter that it
achieves democracy through a two-step derivative process. 40 In the first step,
international organizations are accountable to governments, and in the second
step, each government is accountable to its own public. This reasoning is
especially salient for the WTO because its decisions need the consent of all of
the member governments. 4 '
The pessimists do not dispute the relevance of democracy for an
international organization, but contend that it cannot be accomplished for
practical reasons. Robert Dahl espouses this position. Distinguishing his
approach from what he calls the "optimistic" view that international institutions
can be democratized, Dahl argues that the extent of delegation involved in
international organizations goes well beyond any acceptable threshold of
democracy.42 As a result, he concludes that he "see[s] no reason to clothe
international organizations in the mantle of democracy simply in order to
a "democratic
provide them with greater legitimacy."' 4 3 Furthermore, he accepts
44
governments."
international
all
of
cost
likely
deficit" as "a
The reformists contend that international organizations need a democratic
transformation. David Held, for example, has written that "[t]he establishment
of an international assembly of democratic peoples, directly elected by them
and accountable to them, is an unavoidable institutional requirement" for a
38. Marks, supra note 8, at 50. Marks attributes the container metaphor to Anthony McGrew.
39. Martin Wolf, Of Tuna, Turtles and Red Herrings, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at 27.

40. See Mike Moore, Trade, Development and Democracy: The Need for Reform of the WTO, Speech
Before the European Parliament Seminar (Apr. 10, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/news -e/spmme/
spmm57_e.htm ("The WTO is above all an intergovernmental organization. So it is mainly accountable to the
people through their governments."); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 25, 31 ("In the legitimacy of
national regimes resides the legitimacy of the international regime.")
41. WTO, 10 Common Misunderstandings About the WTO: 10, at www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatis_e/l0mise/10ml0_e.htm (stating that decisions at the WTO are more democratic than majority rule
because everyone has to agree).
42. Robert A. Dahl, Can InternationalOrganizationsBe Democratic?A Skeptic's View, in DEMOCRACY'S
EDGES 19,22, 52 (lan Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cord6n eds., 1999).
43. Id. at 32.
44. Id. at 34.
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cosmopolitan democracy. 45 Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have proposed a
"Global Peoples Assembly." 46 The reformist proposals typically are centered
on introducing voting into global governance.
In contrast to these three perspectives, this article adopts a fourth view.
The reformists are right that the international level needs democratic processes,
but the fixation on elections as a litmus test (even if holding them were doable)
overlooks the greater value of open, continuous participatory decisionmaking
processes. Elections are hardly the container of democratic aspirations. In his
last major public address, delivered in 1919, Woodrow Wilson explained that
the important thing about "opinion" in democracy was not the number of
people who hold it, but rather the process of weighing the opinion so "that
every voice can be heard, every voice can have its effect, every voice can
contribute to the general judgment that is finally arrived at."'47 While reformists
focus too heavily on elections as a means of adding democracy to global
governance, the pessimists go too far in contending that the public must accept
the non-democratic character of international organizations. The NGO protests
of the past few years have shown how easy it is to question the legitimacy of
international organizations and to support the alternative vision of localization
as being more democratic. While the state centrists are wrong to dismiss the
democratic critique of the WTO and other organizations, they are right to
underline the state centricity of the current system because that character must
be respected in finding solutions to the democratic deficit internationally.
Furthermore, finding such solutions is requisite for avoiding the inefficiencies
of localized governance in an interdependent world.
This fourth view might be called "functional" because it considers
openness to nongovernmental input as part of the normal function of an
international organization. The term functional is used because it links David
Mitrany's views on international cooperation along functional lines with his
insight about the democratic role of NGOs. Mitrany was one of the first
political scientists to grasp the connection between NGOs and the challenge of
international democracy. In his 1954 essay, "An Advance in Democratic

45. DAVID

HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER

273 (1995). Held has also suggested the

possibility of general referenda cutting across nations. Id.
46. Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the
Power of PopularSovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2000).
47. WOODROW WILSON, Address at Pueblo. Colorado (Sept. 25, 1919), in ADDRESSES OF PRESIDENT
WILSON, S.Doc.No. 66-120, at 359, 364 (1st Sess. 1919).

2003]

THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

Representation," Mitrany postulated that Article 71 of the U.N. Charter was an
"important step toward a possible modem solution of the problem of
democratic representation."4 8 Greater NGO participation in the functional
agencies of the United Nations, Mitrany explained, would reestablish and
canalize democratic initiative and control.4 9 Viewing as unrealistic the idea of a
"world parliament," Mitrany suggested that NGOs could be made into
"instruments of really informed democratic representation."5 Just as informed
private groups are needed within the state to help shape policy, the greater the
development ofjoint international activities, "the greater will obviously be the
need and scope for the relevant non-governmental organizations to be
associated with those activities."'" The democratic function of NGOs was twoway, according to Mitrany. It was as important for NGOs to inform the general
public on what "their particular specialized agency is doing, and make clear the
reasons for it, as to act as the voice of that public opinion at the seat of
52
power.,
Mitrany's analysis was influenced by Lyman Cromwell White, a political
scientist who studied NGOs. 3 In 1949, White wrote that
[i]t is an expression of democracy when groups from various
nations work together in solving their common problems; this
is particularly true when they try to influence
intergovernmental organizations .... Thus the influence and

the future of international nongovernmental organization is
connected with the growth of democratic attitudes within
54
states and also within intergovernmental organizations.

48. David Mitrany, An Advance in DemocraticRepresentation, in A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 121, 124
(1966) [hereinafter Mitrany, Advance in Democratic Representation]. The article on democratic
representation had been originally published in InternationalAssociations, the journal of the Union of
International Associations. For Mitrany's views on the role of functional cooperation in achieving peace, see
generally A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM (collection of essays by Mitrany).
49. Mitrany, Advance in Democratic Representation,supra note 48, at 125.
50. Id. at 126.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 128.
53. Id. (citing LYMAN C. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THEIR
PURPOSES, METHODS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 12 (1951)).
54. Lyman C. White, Peaceby Pieces-TheRole of Nongovernmental Organizations,264 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 87, 91 (1949).
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The dating of the emergence of democratic participation has an importance
beyond historical accuracy. Typically, NGO participation is said to be a recent
phenomenon that cannot fully be reconciled with state-centric theories of
international law and organization." The deeper NGO participation is thought
to have started after the end of the Cold War or perhaps earlier in the U.N.
global conferences of the 1970s. 56 But by portraying NGO participation as a
fairly recent phenomenon, pro-NGO analysts devalue the significance of the
longtime constructive role that civic society groups have played in helping
governments solve economic and social challenges.
While Mitrany was correct to call attention to the drafting of Article 71 of
the U.N. Charter in 1945 as a key legislative development, this article suggests
the more important year came a generation earlier. In my view, the Peace
Conference in Paris in 1919 should be recognized as the fount for the idea that
state practice would accept NGO participation in international organizations.
Part II of this article will discuss this important moment in international
governance.
II. NGO PARTICIPATION AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919
Following World War I, the victorious allies and associated powers held a
preliminary conference which began in January 1919 in Paris and concluded
five months later with the full Peace Conference held in Versailles. Thirtythree governments participated in the negotiations and signed the Treaty of
Versailles (including Germany). 7 It was not just a North Atlantic treaty; the
signatories also included China, Japan, Siam, Liberia, South Africa, Bolivia,
Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. In addition, many delegations came from
non-self governing territories and colonies, and these delegations were
sometimes afforded the opportunity to provide formal or informal input into the
negotiations.5 8 Besides setting the terms of the peace, the Treaty of Versailles

55. See, e.g., Stephan Hobe, Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of
Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (1997).

56. See Daniel C. Thomas, International NGOs, State Sovereignty, and Democratic Values, 2 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 389(2001) (explaining that in the mid to late twentieth century, a new set of actors, NGOs, began to assert
their voice in international diplomacy).
57. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol.
T.S. 188 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
58. See generally STEPHEN BONSAL, SUITORS AND SUPPLIANTS: THE LITTLE NATIONS AT VERSAILLES
(1946).
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also established the League of Nations. The conference's broad participation
and agenda justify giving the five-month negotiation the moniker of a global
conference.
The conference was self-consciously viewed as a pivotal moment in global
governance in which an international community would be formed through the
legal and moral principles enunciated in the treaty and through the
establishment of the League of Nations. The leading figure at the conference,
Woodrow Wilson, sensed that democracy was in the air. Reporting on the
mood of the conference a few months later, Wilson said:
There was not a single statesman at Paris who did not know
that he was the servant, and not the master, of his people.
There was not one of them who did not know that the whole
spirit of the times had changed and that they were there to see
that people were liberated, not dominated; that people were
put in charge of their own territories and their own affairs.5 9
It was clear that Wilson saw the Paris negotiations as different from the
ones before it, and recognized that this had implications for the future of
democracy. He said:
Every previous international conference was based upon the
authority of governments. This, for the first time, was based
on the authority of peoples. It is, therefore, the triumphant
establishment of the principles of democracy throughout the
world.... 60
In other speeches, Wilson referred to the Treaty of Versailles as "a people's
61
treaty" and "a people's and not a statesmen's peace.",
Five years after the Paris conference, Albert Thomas recalled the "mental
attitude" of that period as being a "general feeling that the old world must be

59. WOODROW WILSON, Address at Reno, Nevada (Sept. 22, 1919), in ADDRESSES OF PRESIDENT
WILSON, supra note 47, at 307, 310.
60. WOODROW WILSON, Address at Tabernacle,Salt Lake City, Utah (Sept. 23, 1919), in ADDRESSES OF
PRESIDENT WILSON, supra note 47, at 321, 334.
61. WOODROW WILSON, Address at Auditorium, Los Angeles. California(Sept. 20, 1919), in ADDRESSES
OF PRESIDENT WILSON, supra note 47, at 291; WILSON, supranote 47, at 360.
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Noting that "there are moments in history when the human

spirit seems to rise for an instant above all the controversies of the day," and
recalling the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, Thomas
suggested the occurrence of"a similar moment in 1919," although he admitted
63

that this international episode of liberty and equality "was not so clear-cut.,
When the conference convened in Paris in 1919, many private groups sent
representatives to press their views. 64 Building on unofficial lobbying going
back over a century, and most recently at the Hague Peace Conferences,
concerned individuals perceived that they would make more progress on their
cause by influencing the many governments meeting in Paris than by
influencing their own government at home. Writing a few years after the Paris
Conference, Jane Addams explained that because the official delegates to the
peace conference would be diplomats who were "seldom representative of
modem social thought," the idea crystallized that "other groups should convene
in order to urge the importance of certain interests which have hitherto been
inarticulate in international affairs." 65 The convening groups issued a frisson of
communications to the assembled government officials.
The governments manifested some openness from the start. The official
rules for the Paris Conference provided that the secretariat would compile a list
of petitions from private groups and individuals and distribute it to the
government delegations.6 6 On at least one topic, the governments requested
technical assistance from NGOs. The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection
Society was asked to come to Paris to provide assistance on the Treaty's
67
Nevertheless, in many other ways, the
provisions regarding mandates.
governments made it hard for NGOs to influence the proceedings. Little
transparency existed in the day-to-day deliberations of the governments. All of
the working sessions were closed to the public.
62. ALBERT THOMAS, INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY 141 (1948). Thomas, a French moderate socialist,
was the first Director of the International Labor Organization.
63. Id. at 142.
64. WARREN F. KUEHL, SEEKING WORLD ORDER 267 (1969); PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 93 (1998) (discussing the representatives from national independence
movements); PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCES OF DELEGATES OF ALLIED SOCIETIES FOR A LEAGUE OF
NATIONS 19 (League to Enforce Peace, 1919) (urging that private societies establish a bureau in Paris to sit
during the Peace Conference).

65. JANE ADDAMS, PEACE AND BREAD INTIME OF WAR 152-53 (G.K. Hall & Co. 1960) (1922). Addams
notes that private conferences were held by women, labor, Zionists and similar groups.
66. Nathan Feinberg, La P6tition en Droit International,40 RECUEIL DES COUPS 529, 556-58 (1932).
67. C.W.W. GREENIDGE, SLAVERY 166 (1958).
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The Paris Conference became an important moment in global governance
for many reasons, but this article will focus on only one-the way that private
individuals and NGOs played roles alongside the conference, and in some
instances, inside it. The article will look at four groups and how they
participated. The groups are: labor unions, Jewish and Zionist organizations,
women's groups, and the American Red Cross. The activism of the women is
particularly notable because in many countries at the time, females did not have
a right to vote.
A. Labor Unions
International labor legislation was on the agenda at the opening meeting of
the preliminary peace conference. 68 At that session, the governments
established a Commission to draft labor provisions for the treaty. 69 To
represent the United States, President Wilson appointed Samuel Gompers,
of Labor, and A.N. Hurley, President of
President of the American Federation
rd70
the American Shipping Board . France named Leon Jouhaux, the leader of the
French labor federation, to its delegation. 71 The other Commission members
were government officials. Gompers was elected chairman of the Labor
Commission. 72
The world's labor leaders would have gone to Paris, but France would not
give all of them visas. Instead, a labor conference was held in Berne,
Switzerland.
The International Trade Union Conference drafted two
resolutions: one regarding the proposed labor provisions in the Peace Treaty
and the other regarding the League of Nations. 73 These resolutions were
officially presented to French President Georges Clemenceau, in his role as
68. JAMES T. SHOTWELL, AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 128 (1919). See also EDWARD C. LORENZ,
DEFINING GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS POLICY 70-72

(2001).
69. THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, RESEARCH REPORT NO.
48, at 20-22 (1922).
70. Edward J. Phelan, The Commission on InternationalLabor Legislation, in I THE ORIGINS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 127, 128-29 (James Brown Scott et a]. eds., 1937).
71. AUSTIN VAN DER SLICE, INTERNATIONAL LABOR, DIPLOMACY, AND PEACE 1914-1919, at 350 (1941).

Jouhaux, a legendary labor leader, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1951.
72. See JOHN MAINWARNG, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION: A CANADIAN VIEW 14-15
(1986); PAUL PERIGORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 86 (1926); see also Carol Riegelman,
War-Time Trade-Union and Socialist Proposals, in I THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION, supra note 70, at 55, 77; VAN DER SLICE, supra note 71, at 217.
73. VAN DER SLICE, supra note 71, at 329-30.
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president of the peace conference, and to the official Labor Commission.74 In
parallel with the labor meeting, the Socialists also held a conference in Berne,
with some crossover participation. This NGO conference caused great
consternation among the official delegates in Paris. An observer of both the
official Paris Conference and the socialist meetings in Berne commented that
the former was surrounded by 200 journalists and the latter by 200 detectives.75
In assessing labor's influence on the peace conference, one has to
distinguish between the Treaty of Versailles' labor provisions and its political
and economic provisions. The plan for Part XIII of the Treaty, which
established the International Labour Organization (ILO), was influenced to a
considerable extent by the resolutions passed by labor federations during the
war and reiterated at Berne. By contrast, the International Trade Union
Conference's advice on the provisions of the Treaty regarding Germany did not
have any restraining impact on the decision of the governments to extract
retribution. In a book chapter on "Labor's Lobbying at Paris," Austin Van der
Slice notes the asymmetry in the trade unions' impact and observes that labor,
"more than any other politically organized section of the public, had
76
approached the peace with a truly international outlook.,
The ELO is the most daring of all international organizations in its approach
to NGO participation. "[F]or the first time in history," wrote Manley 0.
Hudson, international cooperation "was organized with some reference to other
than national interests....,7 Under the ILO's Constitution, each member State
sends four delegates-two from government, one from employers, and one
from workers.7 8 Within the ILO, there is formal equality between government
and non-government representatives. No effort is made to segregate the
government and non-government delegates into separate chambers. The ILO
does not view states only as hierarchies, and so delegates from each country

74. See id. at 329; Manifesto of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne, February 10, 1919, on
International Labor Legislation, in 2 THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, supra note
70, at 336.
75. VAN DER SLICE, supra note 71, at 321.
76. Id. at 343, 375.
77. MANLEY 0. HUDSON, PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 48 (1932).
78. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 57, art. 389; for the current version, see INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANISATION CONST.,

about/iloconst.htm.

art. 3.1 [hereinafter ILO

CONST.],

available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
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vote individually, not as a unit.7 9 Thus, the drafters of the ILO contemplated

that an NGO delegate might vote in opposition to its government.
In summary, the high points of labor participation in Paris are as follows.
Trade union groups from many countries held a parallel meeting to draft
recommendations for the preliminary peace conference, and these were
officially communicated. At the commencement of the conference, the
governments set up a Commission on Labor Legislation, and its members
selected the President of the American Federation of Labor to chair that body.
The Commission produced draft language for Part XIII of the Treaty of
Versailles. When it was initiated in 1919, the ILO was the only international
organization to provide full participation rights for NGO delegates. Today, it
remains unique in that respect.
B. Jewish and Zionist Organizations
The most organized minority NGOs in Paris were the Jewish groups and
Zionists. 80 While they were united on the issue of allowing Jewish settlement
in Palestine, they were at loggerheads over whether Jews in Eastern and Central
Europe should be allowed to establish their own entities.8' The American
Jewish Congress, the Alliance Isra6lite Universelle (French Jews), and the Joint
Delegation (British Empire Jews) did not want to push for "group rights," but
compromised with the Russian and Eastern European Jewish groups8 2 All of
the groups assembled regularly in the Committee of Jewish Delegations at the
Peace Conference. 3 Committee members met frequently with governments
and submitted draft language for the treaty regarding minority rights and for the
administration of Palestine. 4 They also asked for an opportunity to make a

79. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 57, art. 390, para. 1; ILO CONST., supra note 78, art. 4.1. Delegates
representing a government assuredly vote according to the government's instructions.
80. On the Zionists, see generally HORACE MEYER KALLEN, ZIONISM AND WORLD POLITICS (1921). See
also generally NAHUM SOKOLOW, HISTORY OF ZIONISM, 1600-1918 (Ktav Publ'g House 1969) (1919).
81. OSCAR I. JANOWSKY, THE JEWS AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1898-1919), 264, 287, 386 (1933). This

proposal of separate entities was not accepted by the governments. Id. at 388.
82. Id. at 264, 268-69, 387.
83. Id. at 287. During the Conference, the Committee issued a Bulletin covering the peace negotiations
and sent it to journalists and political leaders. Id. at 357-59 n.19.
84. See 2 DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 747-48 (1939); JANOWSKY,
supra note 81, at 331, 335, 339-40; see also FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 155 (Harlan B. Phillips ed.,
1960); MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 141 (1982);

Memorandum ofthe Committee ofJewish Delegationsat the PeaceConference, in JACOB ROBINSON ET AL.,
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presentation to the official commission dealing with minority questions, but this
was not granted8 5
It is unclear what impact the Jewish groups' participation had on the
drafting of the Minorities Treaty with Poland and the agreement to place similar
provisions in forthcoming bilateral accords. 86 Certainly, the Jewish groups
were not the only ones pushing for such language. The Minorities Treaty
provided that Polish nationals would have the right to establish, manage, and
control "charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools and other
educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to
' 87
exercise their religion freely therein.
Among the many meetings the Jewish and Zionist groups had in Paris, one
stands out. The Zionist Mission to the Peace Conference (including Chaim
Weizmann) was allowed to address the Council of Five. 88 Although only one
head of delegation was present (Italy), that the meeting even occurred was
significant, because the Zionists were speaking for a transnational cause, not
claiming to be a state. The Zionists submitted a draft resolution concerning the
status of Palestine. 89
It is interesting to note that Zionists were opposed by other nongovernmental groups, including fundamentalist Christians and the American
Missionary Association.9" Two Christian representatives in Paris persuaded
President Wilson to send them to survey local attitudes in Palestine where they
found widespread opposition to the Zionist program. 9' The Young Palestinians

WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? 319 app. 11 (1943); ProposalsforProtection ofMinorities,in 8
MY DIARY AT THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 422 (David Hunter Miller ed., 1924).
85. Feinberg, supra note 66, at 560.
86. See Treaty of Versailles, supranote 57, art. 93; JANOWSKY, supranote 81, at 335,339,341; Minorities
Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, June 28, 1919,225 Consol. T.S. 412
(hereinafter Minorities Treaty]; LEAGUE OF NATIONS, PROTECTION OF LINGUISTIC, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS AT PRESENT IN FORCE (1927). There were six minorities treaties concluded in 1919.
87. Minorities Treaty, supra note 86, art. 8.
88. See BARNET LITVINOFF, WEIZMANN: LAST OF THE PATRIARCHS 128-30 (1976); 15 MY DIARYATTHE
CONFERENCE OF PARIS, supra note 84, at 104-17; see generally 4 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919 159-72 (1943) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES]. The Council of Five included the Principal Powers-that is, the United States, the British
Empire, France, Italy, and Japan.
89. GEORGE, supra note 84, at 747.
90. See PARRISH, supra note 84, at 143.

91. Id.
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of Mexico did not travel to Paris, but did send a telegram to the Conference
asking that the integrity of Syria be respected.92
The high points of Jewish and Zionist participation are that the groups held
regular meetings to harmonize group positions and to plan how to lobby
governments with draft treaty language. The opportunity given to the Zionist
Mission to address the Council of Five was a significant milestone in
transnational participation. The Jewish groups probably had some influence on
the provisions in the minorities treaties.
C. Women's Groups

The Second International Congress of Women, organized by the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom, did not meet in Paris because the
women from Germany could not get visas.93 The Congress was instead held in
Zurich and included women from sixteen countries. The Congress sent
recommendations to the preliminary peace conference-for example, proposing
94
that treaties be ratified only after approval of an elected legislative body.
Several leaders of the women's movement came to Paris. As Nitza
Berkovitch has observed, the women sought to "carve out a space for
themselves within the emerging agenda" and to "constitute themselves as a
group with distinct interests that should be represented in the new world
95
arena."
In February 1919, President Wilson reported to the Supreme Council of
Five that he had been visited by women's suffrage organizations who had asked
the conference to address the conditions of women and children throughout the
world.9 6 Wilson proposed the appointment of an official Commission to which
women's organizations would be permitted to send some representatives to
participate in a consultative capacity. The Commission was to inquire into the
92. 17 MY DIARY AT THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS, supra note 84, at 96.
93. LINDA K. SCHOTT, RECONSTRUCTING WOMEN'S THOUGHTS: THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE
FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM BEFORE WORLD WAR 11,78 (1997); LEILA J. RUPP, WORLDS OF WOMEN: THE
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 29,211 (1997).
94. See GERTRUDE BUSSEY & MARGARET TIMS, WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND
FREEDOM, 1915-1965, at 29-31 (1965); WOMEN'S INT'L LEAGUE FORPEACE AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE
15TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 245 (1919).
95. NITZA BERKOVITCH, FROM MOTHERHOOD TO CITIZENSHIP: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 73 (1999).
96. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 1022-23; JAMES T. SHOTWELL, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JAMES T. SHOTWELL 115 (1961).
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conditions in Europe and the United States and report to the conference
whether any international regulations should be issued. This proposal was
debated but was withdrawn by Wilson after receiving insufficient support from
the other governments.97 During the debate, French President Clemenceau
suggested that the women's recommendations could simply be referred to the
Commission on Labor that had already been created. Wilson responded that
this would not satisfy the women who had "asked for recognition. 98 A few
weeks later, Clemenceau reported to the Council of Ten that he too had been
visited by the women's groups who were seeking the opportunity to take part in
the Peace Conference.9 9 Clemenceau explained that he had told the women that
they should ask to be heard by the official Commissions on the League of
Nations and on Labor. Following a discussion, the Council of Five agreed that
the women's groups could send a deputation to both commissions.' 00 During
the discussion, Italian Foreign Minister Barone Sidney Sonnino reported that he
had also been visited by the women's groups.
The first opportunity to testify came at the Commission on Labor, which
was about to complete its work. In mid-March, the Inter-Allied Conference of
Women Suffragists made a presentation, mainly on issues concerning the
working conditions for women in industry.'0 ' On the next day, the Commission
made slight changes in wording in response to the recommendations of the
women.I2
In April 1919, a joint delegation of the International Council of Women
and the Inter-Allied Conference of Women Suffragists made a presentation to
the Commission on the League of Nations.'0 3 Their key recommendations
were: an agreement to suppress traffic in women, the eligibility of females for
League positions, the recognition of the principle of women's suffrage in the
Treaty, the right of women to vote in plebiscites deciding questions of
97. Feinberg, supra note 66, at 559.
98. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 1022.

99. Id. at 326.
100. See ARNOLD WHITTICK, WOMAN INTO CITIZEN 70 (1979).
101. See SHOTWELL, supranote 68, at 216 n. 1.
102. Id. at 219.
103. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN, WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD 45, 344-45 (1966); David
Hunter Miller, The Making of the League of Nations, in WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 421 (Edward
Mandell House & Charles Seymour eds., 1921); 2 DAVID HUNTER MILLER, THE DRAFTING OF THE
COVENANT 344, 361-62 (photo. reprint 1998) (1928) [hereinafter DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT]; WHI'rmCK,
supra note 100, at 71; P. ROSSELLO, LES PRkCURSEURS DU BUREAU INTERNATIONAL D' EDUCATION 132-37
(1943).
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nationality, the creation of an international bureau of public health, the creation
of an international bureau of education, and a statement in favor of arms
control. 1°4 Language reflective of some of these proposals appeared in the
Treaty of Versailles.10 5
These episodes show very skillful participation by the women's groups.
When Wilson's support for their proposal proved insufficient, the women
moved to lobby the blocking governments. What makes this episode especially
noteworthy is that not only were the women heard, but they seem to have been
successful in influencing the content of the Treaty. The activities of these
women's groups did not go unnoticed by other NGOs that opposed feminism.
For example in the United States, the National Association Against Women's
Suffrage sent a letter to Paris asking that the Peace Conference set aside the
06
issue of women's suffrage because it was a domestic issue.'
The high points of the efforts by the women's NGOs are a parallel
conference in Zurich, and direct lobbying in Paris that led to opportunities to
make presentations to two key commissions. In both instances, some of the
recommendations from the women were incorporated into the Treaty.
D. Red Cross
Following the Armistice, the challenges of combating famine and disease
led to the idea of expanding the role of Red Cross societies to peacetime
service.107 Such service was not alien to the Red Cross idea (particularly the
American Red Cross), but it would require changes in Red Cross operations.
The champion of this new mission was Henry P. Davison, the chairman of the
war council of the American Red Cross. Davison concluded that, because this
mission would necessitate more international cooperation, a new "virile"

104. EGON F. RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT 365-67 (1945); see also
CLASINA A. KLUYVER, DOCUMENTS ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONs 298, 317-20 (1920).

105. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 57, arts. 7 (employment), 23(c) (traffic), art. 50, Annex, paras. 28
(voting in local assemblies in Saar) & 34 (plebiscitary voting in Saar), 88, Annex paras. 4 (plebiscitary voting
in Silesia), 95 (plebiscitary voting in East Prussia), 109 (plebiscitary voting in Schleswig). Female suffrage
was not included. International legislation was not enacted until 1953 with the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women.
106. Feinberg, supra note 66, at 558.
107. JOHN F. HUTCHINSON, CHAMPIONS OF CHARITY: WAR AND THE RISEOF THE RED CROsS279 (1996);
CLYDE E. BUCKINGHAM, FOR HUMANITY'S SAKE: THE STORY OF THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES 27 (1964).
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international League of Red Cross Societies should be created. 0 8 Not
surprisingly, this led to resistance by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), by then a 55-year old NGO, which worried that its control of the
Red Cross movement would be undermined.
After receiving a go-ahead from President Wilson, Davison went to Europe
in early 1919 to set up the new League of Red Cross Societies of Allied
countries.' 0 9 When he met resistance from the ICRC, Davison saw that it
would be very difficult to achieve recognition of his new League through
revision of the Red Cross Convention of 1906.11 ° Therefore, Davison switched
tactics and sought to gain official recognition by the League of Nations for the
new relief work of the Red Cross."' He gained an ally in Colonel Edward
House of the U.S. delegation, and House then championed what became Article
25 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 1 2 This Article states that
governments "agree to encourage and promote the establishment and cooperation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having
as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease, and the
mitigation of suffering throughout the world.""' 3 This language fell short of
Davison's goal-which was an explicit link between the League of Red Cross
Societies and the League of Nations-but simply by being in the Treaty, it
facilitated future cooperation between the Red Cross and the League. An early
draft of Article 25 had authorized the creation of a "non-political and nongovernmental" International Red Cross League, but
this was shortened by
4
David Hunter Miller of the American delegation."

108. HUTCHINSON, supra note 107, at 285-87.
109. Id. at 287-89; GEORGE WILLEMIN & ROGER HEACOCK, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE

RED CROSS 26 (International Organization and The Evolution of World Society Series Vol. 2, 1984).
110. HUTCHINSON, supra note 107, at 289-95.
111. BUCKINGHAM, supra note 107, at 62-63; HUTCHINSON, supra note 107, at 295-96.

112. 4 THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE 257-59 (Charles Seymour ed., 1928) (providing a
memorandum by Colonel House suggesting that governments give moral endorsement to Red Cross); H.R.G.
GREAVES, THE LEAGUE COMMITTEES AND WORLD ORDER 88-89 (1931); David Kennedy, The Move to
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In April 1919, the new League of Red Cross societies convened a meeting
in Cannes to discuss measures to address the outbreak of disease in Central
Europe. In addition to some Red Cross societies and the ICRC, the meeting
included eminent authorities in public health, sanitary science, hygiene,
nursing, and child welfare." 5 The League of Red Cross Societies then sent a
communication to the Council of Five offering to implement relief efforts if the
governments would agree to support these efforts. The communication noted
that the new League of Red Cross Societies was "the natural and at present only
agency available to undertake this work....16
Two high points for NGO influence can be seen in this episode. One is that
a national NGO working through its home government was able to get an
article added to the Covenant. More noteworthy is that this new article
committed governments to support and utilize the NGOs involved in health and
relief work.
E. Emerging State Practice on Participation
Paris in 1919 was not the first time that NGOs had held side events
alongside intergovernmental conferences. That had occurred at the Hague
Peace Conferences. 1 7 Yet Paris was the first time that individuals from NGOs
were accorded an opportunity to participate in a major lawmaking conference.
It is unclear to what extent the diplomats at the time perceived the NGOs as
exercising democratic rights in a global community. More likely, the diplomats
saw the NGO engagement in functional terms; that is, the NGOs had expertise
that was useful for the particular decisions being made by the governments.
While any one of the four episodes described above can be explained in
traditional, state-centric terms (after all, Gompers was appointed by the U.S.
government to the Labor Commission), a look at the patterns of NGO activity
shows that something new was afoot. When governments from around the
world met in Paris to write rules for the postwar world, their gathering became
a magnet drawing in NGOs. The minimal presence of business groups in Paris
reflected their lack of institutional cohesion. Lessons were learned, however,

115. HUTCHINSON, supra note 107, at 299.
116. 10 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 285-89 (1947).
117. Charnovitz, supra note 37, at 196-97; ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE 1899 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE
348-51 (1999).
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and by the next year, the International Chamber of Commerce and the
International Organization of Industrial Employers were launched.
State practice towards NGOs matured at the Paris conference. Before 1919,
no customary norm existed on NGO participation. After 1919, the developing
norm (or at least best practice) was that governments would recognize the
legitimacy of the NGO activities alongside international conferences, and
would give consideration to requests by NGOs to make presentations on topics
of NGO expertise.
The driving force of this new norm was the important change taking place
in the character of world governance. Well before 1919, governments had
cooperated along functional lines, and these concerts had attracted attention by
NGOs." 8 Yet 1919 brought the creation of a central organization that would
sponsor extensive cooperation in many fields and set up specialized agencies.
Such an ongoing organization would develop footholds for NGOs to step into.
As Jos6 Alvarez has noted, "international organizations are often the conduit
for the growing clout of NGOs."" 9
The fact that the Covenant of the League of Nations did not contain an
NGO consultation provision did not deter NGOs from seeking involvement in
the League. In my view, the experience of participation at Paris raised the
expectations of NGOs as to their opportunity to be involved in the future.
Thus, the peace conference empowered NGOs. It made them feel a regular part
of the constitutive process. Paris also changed the expectations of governments
about a closed negotiating process and left precedent-minded diplomats with
experiences that made it harder to dismiss NGO requests to be heard. With the
benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that the opportunities given to NGOs at
Paris, in that special moment in history, galvanized the continuation of NGO
participation which then gave global governance a more democratic marrow.

118. See generally CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE:
INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 (John Boli & George M. Thomas eds., 1999); AKIRA IRIYE, GLOBAL
COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD (2002).
119. Jos6 Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 227 (2002) (footnote
omitted).
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III. THE GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT

Bruce Ackerman has originated the theory of a "constitutional moment."
Such a moment of political renewal eventuates when "normal politics" gives
way to "higher lawmaking.' 20 This can occur after war, economic catastrophe,
or urgent appeals to the national conscience.12 ' For Ackerman, the essence of
higher lawmaking is not the legal procedure used-for example, a formal
constitutional amendment-but rather whether a mobilized citizenry is able to
' 22
"take the law into its own hands and give governors new marching orders.'
A constitutional moment will have four phases, according to Ackerman.
The first is a signaling phase, when a "movement" is able to place its agenda at
the center of sustained public scrutiny. 23 The signaling phase can be tested by
24
looking at the depth, breadth, and decisiveness of public involvement.
Second, there is the proposal phase, where the higher lawmaking system
encourages the movement to focus its rhetoric into operational proposals for
constitutional reform. 25 The third phase is mobilized popular deliberation,
where the movement's transformative proposals are tested time and again with
the higher lawmaking system. 26 The final phase is legal codification of the
new constitutional solution. 27 The leading officials of government must pledge
to remain faithful to this new solution even when "the People" turn their minds
128
to other public and private pursuits.
Ackerman writes about the United States experience, but his theory might
also have validity for other nations and for international governance. Of course,
when applied to the international level, adjustments will have to be made
because there is no world court playing the same interpretive role as the U.S.
Supreme Court in Ackerman's analysis. In addition, the peoples in the world
community do not have worldwide elections.
For the community of nations, the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles was
the broadest attempt up to that point to promote international cooperation and to
120.
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122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
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manage conflicts. The creation of the League of Nations was certainly an
episode of lawmaking. Whether it can be properly described as "constitutional"
is debatable, yet recall Wilson's observation that this was the first conference
based on the authority of peoples. Although the term "constitutional" has been
applied to international law processes for many decades, 129 scholarly attention
to international constitutionalism has increased in recent years. For example,
Bardo Fassbender contends that "[t]he fundamental rules of a system of
governance concerning the scope and nature of its authority, the allocation of
power to specific organs, and the ways these powers are to be exercised can be
referred to as a constitution, even if that system is an international or
supranational organization. ' 130 Benedict Kingsbury points to the need for a
"richer international constitutionalism" to address issues of "accountability,
mandate, representation, and participation in relation to" NGOs.' 3 '
My hypothesis is that the Paris conference of 1919 was a global
constitutional moment. By that, I mean that it was a transformational moment
in world politics in which states recognized the legitimacy of opening up some
diplomatic conferences to nongovernmental participation, and began to follow a
practice to do so in appropriate circumstances. Those circumstances were when
governments thought that private actors might make a useful contribution. To
test the validity of the constitutional moment, one can look for the four phases
identified by Ackerman.
Long before 1919, NGOs began signaling that they wanted to be involved
in international decisions. 32 These signals were intensified by the pent up
demands and sacrifices of the war. As noted in Part II, groups representing
women, workers, and Jews and Zionists traveled toward Paris to influence the
outcome of the peace negotiations. These movements had different substantive
agendas, yet they shared the same belief that the time had come for
governments to take their views seriously. The group leaders had made a
129. Bruno Simma notes that the term "constitution" was applied to international law in 1926 by Alfred
Verdross. Bruno Simma, From Bilateralismto Community Interest in InternationalLaw, 250 RECUEIL DES
COURS 217, 259-60 (1994). In 1920, Charlemagne Tower used the term "international constitution" in
discussing the fundamental law of international government. Charlemagne Tower, Book Review, 14 AM. J.
INT'L L.464, 466 (1920).
130. Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charteras Constitutionof the InternationalCommunity, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 558 (1998).
131. Benedict Kingsbury, FirstAmendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive Groups
and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of InternationalCivil Society, 3 CHI.J. INT'L L. 183 (2002).
132. Charnovitz, supra note 37, at 195-212; Steve Charnovitz, LearningfromEarly NGO Activity, 92 ASIL
PROC. 338 (1998).
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considered judgment about the rights of citizens and the permanent interests of
the community.' 33 Whether these special interest groups (as well as other
groups in Paris) had enough breadth to show signaling on the issue of public
participation remains unclear.
In the proposal phase, the higher lawmaking system encourages the
movement to focus its rhetoric into operational proposals for constitutional
reform. This happened at Paris when the governments invited the detailed
proposals of the Zionist and women's groups, and when the governments set up
the Labor Commission and named Gompers the chairman. In agreeing to hear
the substance of the NGO proposals, the governments also implicitly agreed to
the innovation of providing space at a diplomatic conference for transnational,
unofficial voices. No previous international conference had directed its
secretariat to compile a list of petitions from private groups and individuals, and
then to distribute it to government delegations.
A deliberative phase is not a significant part of the history as related here.
The change in expectations of participation in international lawmaking was not
debated much among the general public. One way that debate did occur was
that each government made a choice about joining the ILO, knowing that this
would require that its state be represented by worker and employer delegates in
addition to government officials. ILO tripartism was tested over the years and
found to be worth the dilution of state authority.
The last phase is codification. One can look at the inclusion of Article 71
of the U.N. Charter in 1945 as the eventual codification of the unwritten
constitutional change of 1919. Yet codification also occurred through the
customary practices of government delegates at the League of Nations (and
international civil servants) who approved the observer and participant status of
international NGOs in some League activities. 34 Furthermore, two of the
movements in 1919 got immediate legislative codification. The Red Cross
movement was successful in securing Article 25 of the League of Nations
Covenant and organized labor was successful in getting the ILO. Perhaps the
reason why the ILO today is the only international organization with full NGO
participation is that no constitutional moment with the depth of what transpired
in 1919 has occurred since then.

133. See ACKERMAN, supra note 120, at 272.
134. Charnovitz, supra note 37, at 220-37.
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The constitutional moment of 1919 also received a confirming international
judicial endorsement. The first case to come before the Permanent Court of
International Justice was a request for an advisory opinion on the method that
the Government of The Netherlands had used to select its worker delegate to
the ILO. 135 The four major labor federations could not agree on a delegate and
so the government had made the selection. The Court concluded that the
government had acted in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles. The
decision on the merits was unsurprising treaty interpretation. Yet the procedure
used by the Court is especially noteworthy. The Court agreed to hear oral
statements from two international labor union federations allied with the
contending Dutch federations. 136 The Court agreed to do this even though
states were dejure the only entities that could be parties in cases. 137 Thus, the
Court was willing to open its doors to relevant NGO input, just as the
governments had done in Paris and were continuing to do to a small extent in
Geneva (at the League of Nations). I point to this episode not as a validation of
the constitutional moment (as the Court lacked the authority to do that), but
rather to suggest that the judges may have been influenced by the new
participatory norms of that era, and may have acted to reinforce them.
CONCLUSION
This article presents a thesis that 1919 was a global constitutional moment
in which governments initiated new "rules of action"'138 to permit some NGO
participation in international treatymaking. Whether or not one accepts the
reality of a global constitutional moment, the peace conference was certainly an
important milestone in the emergence of nongovernmental participation.

135. Advisory Opinion No. 1,Nomination of the Netherlands Workers' Delegate to the Third Session of the
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Thereafter, many NGOs re-imagined themselves as actors in global governance.
By the 1990s, NGOs had become more comfortable with their proactive role.
In a recent article, Leila Nadya Sadat and S. Richard Carden suggest that the
Rome conference of 1998 (which drafted the statute of the new International
Criminal Court) was "a constitutional moment of sorts-in which the peoples
of the world, as well as, or in spite of, their governments, constructed a new
139
constitutional conception of the international legal order.,
In the tradition of Mitrany, this article makes the further point that issueoriented nongovernmental participation is an important step in solving the
modem problem of democratic representation. The problem is that, being so
distant from national electoral processes, intergovernmental decisionmaking
can erode internal democratic control. Responding to that problem is essential
if global governance is to keep pace with the challenges of interdependence.140
By helping to link the public with international organizations, NGOs will
continue to strengthen the democratic foundations of global governance.
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